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MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Korea
Housing Finance Sector Proiect (Loan 2853-KO)
Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on
Korea - Housing Finance Sector Project (Loan 2853-KO)" prepared by the East Asia
and Pacific Regional Office. Part II was not submitted by the Borrower. The
Completion Report provides an informative and comprehensive account of Project
achievements.
While this project met most of its investment goals and nearly all the
institutional and policy goals, the latter were exceedingly modest. The progress
in targeting the housing subsidies towards the low-income segment of the market
was limited. The impact in the financial area was small because reforms in other
areas were not part of the package. Overall, the project is rated as
satisfactory. The very restrictive land and housing market regulations cast,
however, doubts whether this project approach provides an effective and
sustainable way to reach sector objectives.
In future operations, care should be taken to design broader sector reforms
and optimize their sequencing.
The project is being audited together with the Pusan Urban Management
Project (Loan 2801-KO).
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without WorLd Bank authorization.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
HOUSING FINANCE SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 2853-KO)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Korea Housing Finance
Sector Project, for which Loan 2853-KO in the amount of US$150 million was
approved on June 23, 1987. The last disbursement was made on November 22, 1989
and the loan closed earlier than the scheduled closing date of June 30, 1991.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division of the East
Asia and Pacific Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Su= ary, Parts I and III).
The Borrower did not provide Part II.
Preparation of this PCR was started during the appraisal of the Housing
Project (Loan 3329-KO) in December 1990 and was based, inter alia, on the Staff
Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement, supervision mission reports, correspondence
between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda.
I
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
HOUSING FINANCE SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 2853-KO)
Evaluation Summary
Introduction
i. This project was one of a series developed and implemented since 1980
to address the problems of the Korean housing sector. Bank involvement in this
area began with the National Urban Land Development and Housing Loans I and II
of 1981 and 1982 which supported the activities of government land development
and housing production agencies. A later evaluation of the projects found that
while they had met their physical goals, they had set and met only limited goals
for orienting the country's housing policy. Their impact on the housing sector
was judged to be minimal. A broader sectoral focus was reflected in two
subsequent loans intended to deal with the perceived "bottlenecks" in the housing
sector, the Urban Land Development Project of 1986 (Loan 2704-KO) and the Housing
Finance Sector Project of 1987 (Loan 2853-KO). However, while earlier projects
were mainly concerned with institutional strengthening of major public agencies
and financing investment in housing or land development, the Housing Finance
Sector loan sought to address issues in the government's general housing policy
as they related to housing finance. Thus, it functions as a bridge between
earlier projects and the recently approved Housing Sector Loan, which addresses
housing policy as a whole.
Oblectives
ii. The basic objective of the project was to increase the role of credit
in the Korean housing sector. This objective was to be pursued through two
components. The first was a traditional investment component which would
partially finance an expansion of the National Housing Fund's (NHF) lending
program. The second was a policy action statement and program of activities for
NHF and the Korea Housing Bank (KHB) designed to address the problems identified
in a Housing Finance Sector Study. Loan funds would finance studies and
consultant services in pursuit of this goal. Thus, while the project was
officially an investment project designed to finance the construction of low-
income housing it also sought to have a sector-wide impact through reforms in the
housing finance sector.
iii. Investment Component. Direct financing would be provided for a two-
year time slice (mid 1987 through mid-1989) of NHF lending.- Bank funds would
finance sub-loans to eligible borrowers (government institutions, local
governments, and private contractors) for construction finance to be converted
into long-term mortgages for about 210,000 owner-occupied and rental units. The
total estimated cost of this activity was Won 1,240.6 billion (US$ 1,442.5
million as of January 1987). By the end of 1988, NHF's loan portfolio was
projected to reach W3,726.7 billion, an increase of 20% over the balance at the
end of 1986.
1/ However, the disbursement profile conformed to DFC experience in the
country at that time.
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iv. Policy Component. However, the broader objective of the project was
to achieve the policy objectives described above. The project sought to change
housing finance policy in two areas. The first was reform of the policies of
NHF to increase provision of owner occupied low-income housing and rental housing
and to improve subsidy targeting. The second policy goal was expansion of the
market-based housing finance for middle and upper income groups from KHB or
private institutions.
Implementation Experience
v. Investment Component. NHF's lending program increased substantially
during the course of the project. As of the end of 1988, total lending had
reached W3,806 billion, an increase of 35% over the balance at the end of 1986,
though less than the 43% increase projected at appraisal. In the years
immediately following project implementation, lending expanded rapidly and
quickly exceeded the appraisal estimates. Thus, the project's investment
objectives were met, although the they lagged behind the original timeframe.
vi. Policy Component. In general, the specific policy targets of the
project were met. NHF succeeded in decreasing the size of units financed and
providing smaller units with preferential treatment. Thus, the type of unit
financed by NHF became more affordable to low-income households. Funds allocated
for construction of commercial rental units were increased and the terms for such
loans were made more attractive. KHB expanded its operations almost fourfold
between 1986 and 1990. The major studies of methods for expanding the market-
based housing finance system were completed on a timely basis and a housing
policy seminar was held in 1988.
Results
vii. Despite the fact that nearly all the investment and policy goals of
the project were met, impact on the housing sector was minimal. The government
housing finance system made modest progress in partitioning the market into low
and middle income components and targeting subsidies towards the former.
However, the primary achievement was a decrease in the size of the unit financed
rather than a decrease in the income of the borrower.
viii. The gradual pace of financial sector reform and the exclusion of the
housing finance system from it limited the impact of the reforms achieved under
the project. Controls on the interest rates charged on housing finance loans
inhibited the use of market-priced deposits to fund housing portfolios. Thus,
government housing finance programs continued to be highly dependent on
contractual and obligatory savings schemes. Private financial institutions
expanded their housing portfolios, but not sufficiently to increase their market
share. Thus, the sector continues to be dominated by government directed-credit
institutions. Moreover, the fact that NHF borrowers continued to borrow amounts
below their payment capacity is indicative of the type of credit rationing
associated with repressed financial systems.
ix. Efforts to promote commercial rental housing were also impeded by
regulatory factors. While the amount of financing available for rental units
increased and the terms were made more attractive, regulation of rental housing
deterred the private sector from making use of the increased funding. In
particular, rent control on NHF-financed units and tax treatment of rental
housing income discouraged construction of commercial multi-unit rental housing.
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The number of rental units did increase, but only because of increased
construction of publicly-owned rental housing.
x. In general, regulation of the housing sector impeded completion of
the project's objectives. Increasing the provision of housing finance exerts its
effects on the housing market primarily by increasing the effective demand for
housing. However, severe constraints on supply through restrictive housing
sector policies (designed to reduce speculation) have limited the ability of the
private sector to respond to demand. It will be of little use to expand the
supply of housing finance if the supply of housing is constrained and cannot
respond.
xi. Some of constraints in the supply of housing were met by the large
expansion of government housing construction, which was supported by the Bank's
Urban Land Project. Government efforts to expand the supply of housing had begun
to show results by the end of the 1980s. However, estimates show that the
housing sector still suffers from excess demand and annual production is still
far less than the 1 million units needed to meet existing and future demand.2 1
Apparently, neither the threefold increase in the supply of housing finance nor
the rapid expansion in government land development activitiesR were sufficient
solutions to the problems of the sector, although they did relieve some of the
pressure.
xii. A long-term solution can only come through broadening housing policy
reform to those factors which restrict the supply of housing. While this project
did not directly address these factors, it did contribute to the subsequent
development of a Housing Sector Loan (Loan 3329-KO) with a broader policy
framework.
Sustainability
xiii. Evaluating the probability that the benefits of the project will
continue must again reflect its dual nature as both an investment and a policy
program. In the most narrow sense, the project's investment component is highly
sustainable. The institution in question, NHF, is very strong financially and
likely to continue to be a major source of housing finance. However, the
sustainability of the improvements seen in housing sector conditions observed by
the 1980s is less clear. These improvements were achieved with a massive
government construction program. It iB unlikely that the government can maintain
this level of investment for a sufficient period to improve sector conditions
substantially. Thus, the general approach of Korean housing sector policy may
not be sustainable; a "sustainable" approach would rely on sectoral reforms which
would allow housing supply to adjust to demand. Nonetheless, the willingness of
local officials to meet the targets set forth in this loan suggests a growing
recognition of the need for housing and financial sector reform. This result
bodes well for the more ambitious program of housing reform set forth in Loan
3329-KO and the financial sector reform program contemplated under the proposed
financial sector adjustment loan.
2/ See "Korea: Housing Project," Staff Appraisal Report, 1991.
3/ See Project Completion Report, Urban Land Development Project.
Findincs and Lessons Learned-
xiv. Desian of sector project: Care should be taken not to define the
"sector" so narrowly that although all policy objectives are met, the impact on
the sector is minimal. In this case, the project's impact was limited by the
pace and coverage of financial sector liberalization. While significant
liberalization did occur in the financial sector, it did not extend to the
issues (interest rate term structure, etc.) most vital to the housing finance
system. Thus, housing finance operations should always, to the extent possible,
include representatives of the Ministry of Finance among the official "clients"
and coordinate activities with Bank financial sector operations. In general,
projects with a sectoral or policy focus should monitor policies in other
relevant sectors.
xv. Secuencina in Policy Reform Proarams: Sectoral reform programs must
examine not only the types of reform necessary in the economy, but also their
order. In this case, attempting to expand the housing finance system without
complementary reform of the policies effecting housing supply limited the success
of the project. The importance of sequencing was particularly evident in the
efforts to promote private commercial rental housing through expanded finance,
which were almost totally unsuccessful in the absence of regulatory reform.
Thus, the lack of accompanying reforms of regulations effecting the supply of
housing mitigated the impact of increasing the supply of finance.4/
xvi. Evaluation of Policy Reform Proiects: Extreme care should be applied
to the interpretation of the rates of return achieved in policy reform projects.
For example, in this case, increases in housing prices elevated the rate of
return on units financed by the project. Thus, a seemingly favorable result, a
higher ex post rate of return, actually signified continued distortions in the
housing sector. For this reason, project economic evaluations should include
analysis of the factors contributing to the change in rate of return estimates
and how these factors relate to the project's policy objectives.
4/ The subsequent Housing Sector Project, Loan 3329-KO, is addressing these
regulatory issues.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
HOUSING FINANCE SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 2853-KO)
PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
Proiect Identity
- Project Name: Housing Finance Sector Project
- Loan No.: 2853-KO
- RVP Unit: East Asia and Pacific Region
- Country Republic of Korea
- Sector: Urban
- Subsector: Housing
Introduction
1. This project was one of a series developed and implemented since 1980 to
address the problems of the Korean housing sector. Bank involvement in this area
began with the National Urban Land Development and Housing Loans I and II of 1981
and 1982 which supported the activities of Government land development and
housing production agencies. A later evaluation of the projects found that while
they had met their physical goals, they had set and had met only limited goals
for orienting the country's housing policy. Their impact on the housing sector
was judged to be minimal. A broader sectoral focus was reflected in two
subsequent loans intended to deal with the perceived "bottlenecks" in the housing
sector, the Urban Land Development Project of 1986 (Loan 2704-KO) and the Housing
Finance Sector Project of 1987 (Loan 2853-KO). However, while earlier projects
were mainly concerned with institutional strengthening of major public agencies
and financing investment in housing or land development, the Housing Finance
Sector loan sought to address issues in the Government's general housing policy
as they related to housing finance. Thus, it functions as a bridge between
earlier projects and the recently approved Housing Sector Loan, which addresses
housing policy as a whole.
2. For this reason, evaluation of the success or failure of this project must
be expanded to issues beyond the traditional analysis of Bank investment
projects. By such criteria--disbursement, compliance with covenants,
institutional sustainability, economic rates of return--the project was
successful. However, its sector focus requires an evaluation based on broader
criteria measuring the ultimate impact on the housing finance system and the
housing sector. Such an evaluation provides two valuable lessons for future
sectoral operations: 1) the importance and proper sequencing of housing sector
policies to the success of housing finance operations and 2) the importance of
addressing housing finance reform within the context of financial sector reform.
-2
Proiect Background
3. The Housing Sector and the Development of Korean Housing Policv. The
portfolio of housing projects cited above is a reflection of the evolution of the
Government of Korea's housing policy and the Bank's role in it. Korean housing
policy has evolved from neglect of the sector through the early 1970s to an
emphasis on direct provision of housing. By the early 1980s Government policy
had shifted to direct provision of important "inputs" in the construction of
housing, namely, serviced land and long-term finance. The Urban Land and
Housing Finance projects were intended to contribute to this effort. only
recently has the integral role of policy in the housing sector been given direct
attention in both the Government's and the Bank's strategy for addressing housing
sector problems.
4. Korean development policy has always entailed a high degree of direct
intervention in the economy. During the 1950s and 1960s, economic growth was
financed by steering resources to export industries through directed credit
programs and other mechanisms. After a period of rebuilding war damages during
the 1950s, housing was largely neglected until the 1970s.
5. At that time, the consequences of years of neglect of the housing sector
began to be seen. Economic growth was accompanied by a rapid rate of
urbanization; the urban population grew at an average annual rate of 5.4% from
1960-88, a rate nearly three times that of the total population. By 1988, the
nation was over three quarters urban. However, low investment in urban housing
led to rapid increases in crowding and housing prices. As a response, a housing
policy was formulated in a ten year housing plan and specific sectoral goals were
set in economic planning.
6. These goals were pursued through a large degree of direct Government
intervention in the production of housing and its major inputs. Several major
institutions were created to finance housing (the Korea Housing Bank, KHB), to
develop serviced land (the Korea Land Development Corporation, KLDC) and to build
and finance low income housing (the Korea National Housing Corporation, KNHC, and
the National Housing Fund, NHF). Under the Third Five Year Economic and Social
Development Plan (1972-76), 30% of new housing was created by both national and
local public agencies. In the late 1970s, an effort to "cool" the housing sector
restricted private housing development, thereby giving public institutions a
still more important role.
7. The Bank began discussions with the Korean Government on the possibility
of a housing loan in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, two loans financing
land development activities of KLDC and housing construction and mortgage lending
through KNHC and NHF (Loans 1980-KO and 2216-KO) had been approved. Both loans
attempted both to improve the operations of the two institutions and to
demonstrate through the Bank-financed portion of their programs the feasibility
of lower plot size and building standards. Later evaluation of these projects
found that while they were largely successful in meeting these goals, they had
little ultimate impact on the housing sector.1 1
8. Despite the increased emphasis on improving conditions, the Korean housing
sector still displayed signs of a large level of excess demand. By 1985 the
Korean housing price index had reached a level almost eight times its 1974 level
while an index of both construction material and general consumer prices grew at
only half that rate. Thus, housing costs grew at an average annual rate of
approximately 20%--a real rate of increase of 6.53% per year. Evidence suggests
that these trends had a significant impact on affordability despite wage
increases during the same years. The ratio of single family house prices to
incomes, a common measure of housing affordability, doubled during the 1970s from
2.31 in 1976 to 5.64 in 1980. Despite a decline in the early 1980s the ratio
remained high at 4.66. Preliminary research suggests that this problems may have
been even more acute among low-income householdsBY
9. By the mid 1980s, the Government had launched a major program to increase
the supply of housing. Two million houses were to be built during the latter
part of the decade. As attempts were made to formulate a response to housing
sector problems, two factors were identified as the major constraints on housing
supply: inadequate supply of serviced land and housing finance. Both public
land development agencies and housing finance institutions were given ambitious
goals to compete as part of this program. This project participated in that
process by addressing the deficiencies in the housing finance sector while Loan
2704-KO, Urban Land Development, addressed the scarcity in the supply of serviced
land.
10. The Housing Finance System. In the early 1980s, the housing finance system
was supplying an inadequate level of credit to meet the demands of the rapidly
growing urban population. The volume of housing loans as a percentage of GNP was
only 6.9% in 1984, compared to 28% in France and the United Kingdom and 41% in
the United States. While in most OECD countries between 60% and 100% of the
value in new homes was covered by mortgages, in Korea only 26% of the value of
housing production was financed. Moreover, while a similar percentage of total
home sales (both new and used) is financed in other countries, it was estimated
that only 10% of the value of all home sales was covered in Korea.
11. The housing finance sector was dominated by the two Government lenders, a
specialized housing bank, The Korea Housing Bank (KHB), and a low-income housing
finance institution managed by KHB, The National Housing Fund (NHF). At loan
appraisal, these institutions accounted for 83% of housing credit. Other lending
institutions displayed little interest in entering the housing finance market,
largely due to restrictions on loan interest rates.
1/ See Project Completion Report, First and Second National Urban Land
Development and Housing Projects, Report No. 9723, 1991.
2/ Kim, 1991, discusses these statistics and the affordability problem in
greater detail
12. Financial Sector Reform and Housing Finance. The regulatory problems
inhibiting the housing finance market were a reflection of a high level of
regulation of the Korean financial system. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both
interest rates and the allocation of credit were strictly controlled to direct
funds to high-priority sectors. However, in the 19809, a program of gradual
financial sector liberalization was initiated. Preferential interest rates were
removed for many programs in 1982 (although some preferential access to credit
was maintained and allowable spreads for financial intermediaries were widened).
Controls over deposit rates were maintained, although they were adjusted so as
to remain positive in real terms. In 1984, rates on other financial assets, such
as corporate bonds, were liberalized. Lending rates were allowed a narrow band
so that lenders could charge differential rates according to credit quality and
other factors. However, except for the 1.5% differential allowed within this
band, rates were not allowed to reflect a normal term structure. In 1988, most
bank and non-bank lending rates were decontrolled, but only long-term deposit
rates were liberalized. The margin between the informal sector and formal sector
(i.e., corporate bond) rates fell from 20% to 11-12% by 1986. By 1990, the two
rates were nearly equal. However, the slow pace of this process was to have an
impact on the ability of a housing finance sector operation to achieve its goals.
13. The Housinc Finance Policy Agenda. A Bank-sponsored housing finance sector
study3 was prepared in 1984. It led to a policy seminar in 1986 and to a
request for Bank financing to support modernization of the housing finance
system. The study recommended that mortgage interest rates, which were still
controlled in the Government-owned institutions, should be included in the
general program of financial sector liberalization, thereby allowing housing
finance institutions to lend at market rates and to adjust rates charged
according to the conditions of the loan and, especially, its maturity. It was
also recommended that other regulatory controls on mortgage finance be lifted,
especially those which limited the loan to value ratio and the maturity of the
loan. Financing should be made available for all types of home purchases,
whether new or used.
14. The study concluded that NHF be maintained as a separate institution from
KHB specializing in low-income loans. However, it was found that NHF lending
policies led to a portfolio almost identical to that of KHB in terms of size of
units financed and the recipients of loans from the two institutions were also
likely to be quite similar. To ensure better targeting of NHF loans, recipient
incomes should be verified rather than using house size as an implicit screening
mechanism and the minimum house size should be reduced. Again, financing should
be available for new or used units and higher loan to value ratios should be
allowed. Funding should also be provided for units produced by private sector
as well as public sector developers. Funds should also be made available for
rental housing construction. Many of these conclusions were incorporated in the
policy objectives of the Housing Finance Project.
3/ "Korea: Housing Finance System," Report No. 5807-KO, June 27, 1986
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Proiect Oblectives and Description
15. The basic objective of the project was to increase the role of credit in
the Korean housing sector. This objective was to be pursued through two
components. The first was a traditional investment component which would
partially finance an expansion of NHF's lending program. The second was a policy
action statement and program of activities designed to address the problems
identified in the Housing Finance Sector Study. Loan funds would finance studies
and consultant services in pursuit of this goal. Thus, while the project was
officially an investment project designed to finance the construction of low-
income housing it also sought to have a sector-wide impact on housing through
reforms in the housing finance sector.
16. The Bank would supply US$150 million in financing to support these
activities. Disbursements would be sub-loans which complied with specific
eligibility criteria ensuring suitability for low-income households.
Project Design and Organization
17. Investment Component. Direct financing would be provided for a two-year
time slice (mid-1987 through mid-1989) of the Government's National Housing Fund
program.4/ Bank funds would finance sub-loans to eligible borrowers (KNHC,
local Governments, and private contractors) for construction finance to be
converted into long-term mortgages for about 210,000 owner-occupied and rental
units. The total estimated cost of this activity was Won 1,240.6 billion (USS
1,442.5 million as of January 1987). By the end of 1988, NHF's loan portfolio
was projected to reach W3,726.7 billion, an increase of 20% over the balance at
the end of 1986.
18. Policy Component. However, the broader objective of the project was to
achieve the policy objectives described above. Basic strategy was stated in a
Policy Statement prepared both for this project and the Sixth Economic and Social
Development Plan. Specific measures to achieve these goals were laid out in a
Program of Actions and Studies. Some policy goals were given explicit objectives
and numerical targets to be fulfilled by specific dates. Others were stated as
more general principles that should guide change, with the specific mechanisms
and timing to be determined in the studies to be performed under the project and
financed by the loan. US$500,000 in financing would be provided in the loan for
studies, consultant services, and training.
19. The project sought to change housing finance policy in two areas. The
first was increased provision of owner occupied low-income housing through
reforms in NHF lending practices and increased provision of rental housing
through incentives provided in NHF's lending program. The second policy area was
expansion of the market-based housing finance for middle and upper income groups
from KHB or private institutions.
4/ However, the disbursement profile conformed to the experience of a
Development Finance Company (DFC) in the country at that time.
20. Improved Targeting of Government Subsidies and Low-income Housing Programs.
The 1986 Bank housing finance study found that although NHF was intended to be
the low-income arm of the public housing finance program, its clientele was
almost identical to that of KHB. A major goal of the project was that NHF
improve its targeting of low-income households through two tactics. The first
tactic was a reform of NHF's lending so as to be more appropriate for low-income
households. Four policy targets were set:
(a) Income of borrowers will be explicitly considered in selecting
borrowers for smaller NHF units; only those below the urban median
will qualify;
(b) Maximum size of an eligible unit was to be reduced from 25.7 py to
18 py (84 to 59 sq. m.);
(c) Tax concessions favoring smaller houses were to be restricted to
smaller units; and
(d) NHF would introduce measures to give buyers of smaller units
preferential treatment with respect to buyers of larger units;
21. Increased Supply of Rental Housing. The second tactic for reaching low-
income households was to include NHF in a general strategy to stimulate
construction of rental housing. Rental housing has traditionally been considered
an affordable option for low-income households, and conditions in Korea supported
this position. Previous studies had found that occupants of rental units with
monthly payments tended to be among the lowest income group. However, the rental
housing market suffered from considerable excess demand and a near zero vacancy
rate. Most rental housing was provided through subdivision of owner-occupied
units. Under these conditions, the cost of gaining rental accommodation was
increasing even more rapidly than that of owner-occupied housing.
22. Moreover, both housing and financial market conditions in Korea impeded
access to affordable rental housing. The Korean rental market has long been
dominated by the widespread use of chonsei, a rental contract in which the tenant
pays for use of the unit through an up-front loan to the owner. The lack of
credit for the household sector made chonsei one of the few methods available to
households for borrowing funds while the tight rental market allowed landlords
to dictate the payment mechanism. However, under chonsei even occupiers of
rental units had to engage in substantial savings or borrowing. While such
contracts are not necessarily more expensive than monthly rental payments, the
cash flow problems created for low-income households restricts their ability to
find affordable shelter.
23. Previously, Government programs had placed a heavy emphasis on supporting
owner-occupied housing and had neglected the rental sector. Under this project,
incentives would be provided for the construction of commercial rental units.
Specifically, NHF would:
(a) Increase lending for rental construction, especially to private
developers;
(b) encourage smaller rental projects by reducing the minimum project
size from 10 units to 5;
In addition, rental housing construction would be supported in the general
housing policy through:
(c) preferential tax treatment for rental housing; and
(d) A study of the current incentives designed to support the
establishment of a rental industry, including the current subsidized
interest rate of 5% charged by NHF.
24. Improvements t6 "Market-Based" Housinq Finance System. While the targeting
of Government-sponsored programs was being improved, the supply of market-based
housing finance was to be increased for those not requiring assistance. This was
to be accomplished by:
(a) Expanding KHB's resource base through:
(i) increasing authorized capital from W50 billion to W300 billion
by the end of 1987.
(ii) enlarging KHB's "scope of business activities"; and
(iii) increasing the autonomy of KHB's management to mobilize funds
from the capital markets by permitting bond issuance without
Government approval.
(b) A Study of Fund Mobilization for the Housing finance system
This study was to explore various mechanisms for expanding resources
mobilized for the housing finance system (HFS) through KHB and other
institutions. These were to include better deposit mobilization and
bond sales
(c) A study of Lending programs to expand borrowers' options
A final study was to explore mechanisms which would make the HFS more
adapted to borrowers needs. These mechanisms were to include higher
LTV ratios, ARMs, and the removal of restrictions on financing
purchases of older homes.
Proiect Implementation
25. Investment Component. NHF's lending program increased substantially during
the course of the project. As of the end of 1988, total lending had reached
W3,806 billion, an increase of 35% over the balance at the end of 1986, though
less than the 43% increase projected at appraisal. In the years immediately
following project implementation, lending expanded rapidly and quickly exceeded
the appraisal estimates. (See Annex II.) Thus, the project's investment
objectives were met, although they lagged behind the original timeframe.
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26. These results were reflected in the project costs and outputs. The total
number of units produced during the project was 203,000 , a slight shortfall from
the 210,000 projected from 1987-88. The total project costs fell from W1249.6
billion to W949.4 billion, a drop of 30%.11
27. Policy Component. In general, the specific policy targets of the project
were met. NHF succeeded in decreasing the size of units financed and providing
smaller units with preferential treatment. KHB expanded its operations almost
fourfold between 1986 and 1990. The development of the second stage of policies
also proceeded on schedule. The major studies of the project were completed on
a timely basis and a housing policy seminar was held in 1988. These changes are
discussed in more detail in Section F.
28. Disbursements. Project implementation reflected the dual nature of the
operation as both an investment and policy loan. However, the loan's
disbursement record demonstrated a tension between these two objectives. Loan
funds were to be disbursed against NHF allocations meeting a number of
procurement and on-lending qualifications and the project was scheduled to fully
disburse by mid-1991. Since the project was officially an investment project,
disbursements were not explicitly linked to completion of the policy action plan.
Sufficient qualifying sub-projects were presented to allow the loan to fully
disbursed by the end of 1989 despite the fact that NHF's lending program ran
behind its lending goals until 1990.
29. Quick disbursement is viewed as a success in investment projects, but it
may not always be conducive to policy-based lending. Eighty percent of project
funds were disbursed by mid 1988. But at that point, only a portion of the
Policy Action Statement had been completed. The divergence between the rate of
disbursements and the completion of the action statement was not ultimately a
problem; preparation for the following project allowed the policy dialogue to
continue. However, in other environments it may be difficult to maintain policy
discussions. Loan covenants to maintain the relationship between the rate of
disbursement and the rate of policy change may be necessary in future operations
to ensure that the Bank retains "a seat at the table."
Maior Results of the Proiect
30. Government Program Targetina. Perhaps the project's greatest success was
in promoting changes in NHF lending policies and underwriting standards which
made financing more accessible to low-income households. The profile of NHF
lending shifted significantly. In 1985, approximately half of the portfolio was
used to finance housing with a floor area of greater than 60 sq.m; by 1990, the
total portfolio was less than 60 sq.m Lending for housing greater than this size
was stopped during the development of the project. This shift represented a
definite division in the market with KHB, two thirds of whose portfolio was
devoted to housing with greater than 60 sq. m. by 1990. Thus, NHF redesigned its
lending program to finance housing which would be more suitable for low-income
borrowers.
5/ Total lending and project costs differ slightly due to the timing of
disbursements.
31. The subsidy policy was also tapered so as to provide greater benefits to
purchasers of smaller units. KHB lending, which is intended for larger housing
units, carries an interest rate of 11.5% and an average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
of 25%. NHF loans for units in the 50-60 sq. m. range, the largest unit
currently financed, have a maximum LTV of 30% and an interest rate of 10%. NHF
loans for purchase of units of less than 40 sq. m. and a loan balance of up to
W12 million now receive a loan with an LTV of 50% and an interest rate of 5%.
32. As a result, the average LTV in the NHF portfolio now reflects the emphasis
on smaller units. The average loan-to-value ratio of the NHF portfolio was
increased from 25% to 40% and the average loan size as of 1990 was
W5.070 million, thereby falling in the smallest size category.
33. Nonetheless, the impact of lending for smaller units on the income level
of NHF loan recipients was modest. Prior to the reforms conducted under the
loan, the average income level of NHF loan recipients was the 70th percentile of
the urban income distribution; the average on post-reform loans improved only
slightly, falling to the 65th percentile. NHF was also more successful in
differentiating the average loan size than it was in differentiating the income
of its clients from those of KHB. Before the reforms, the average income of NHF
loan recipients was 88% of that of KHB; after the reforms it was 82%. Thus,
there was still significant overlap between the clientele of the two
organizations. Apparently, making loans more accessible to lower income
households was not sufficient to substantially change the income group benefiting
from NHF's lending program. NHF was lending to largely the same income group as
previously, though for a larger share of the price of smaller houses.
34. NHF's success in targeting subsidies to lower income households is also
unclear. Both institutions, NHF and KHB, provided an interest rate subsidy to
loan recipients. The rates charged by NHF (10% or 5% depending on the size of
the unit) were lower than the 11.5% charged by KHB. As inflation has increased
over the last five years, the rates of both institutions have declined markedly
in real terms. In comparison with the market corporate bond interest rate
(approximately 16.5% in 1990), the two institutions provide approximate interest
rate subsidies of 6.5% (KHB) and 5% or 11.5% (NHF). However, while NHF loans
carry a lower interest rate and higher LTV, KHB loans are larger. The average
NHF loan in 1990 had an initial balance of W5.07 million while that of KHB was
W7.306 million. Without more information on the exact breakdown of the two
portfolios, it is impossible to compare the distribution of subsidies.
Nonetheless, it would appear that the relatively similar income groups served by
the two institutions are receiving relatively similar subsidies.
35. Thus, the Korean housing finance system made modest progress in
partitioning the market into low and middle income components and targeting
subsidies towards the former. However, the emphasis continues to be on house
size rather than household income. The fact that similar income groups, with
similar payment capacities, were willing to accept a much smaller unit with only
a slightly greater subsidy suggests that credit is still sufficiently rationed
to force households into borrowing less than their payment capacity.
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36. Increased Support for the Rental Market in Government Housinc Finance
Programs. A number of measures, both within and outside NHF's operations were
introduced to expand the supply of rental housing. In 1989, the interest rate
charged for rental unit financing was reduced from 5% to 3% (less than a third
of the rate for owner-occupied housing and 1/6th the corporate bond rate), the
repayment period was extended from 15 to 20 years, and the amount of loan per
dwelling was increased. NHF financed construction of 224,000 rental units
between 1986-90. Lending for rental housing reached W 1,310 billion during these
years, nearly five times the amount in the previous five years and one third of
total lending.
37. However, these terms did not provide sufficient incentives for the
expansion of the commercial, multi-unit rental market. The private sector did
not respond to the availability of rental unit financing and the vast majority
of new financing for construction of rental units was used by the public sector.
This result was almost totally due to the heavy degree of regulation placed on
rental housing. While lending terms for construction of rental units was
relaxed, other housing policies continued to provide strong disincentives for the
production of such units. Rent control on NHF financed units remains strict; the
current allowable "fair rent" for privately-produced rental units using this
financing is only 40-50% of the market rent. Moreover, differential tax
treatment of monthly rental payments and chonsei contracts continues to
substantially favor the latter. A study by the Korea Research Institute for
Human Settlements (KRIHS) found that these disincentives have been sufficient to
discourage private production of rental units even in the face of low interest
rates and lenient lending terms. Thus, expanded financing and improved terms for
commercial rental housing were insufficient to overcome the disincentives created
by the regulatory environment.
38. Evidence also suggests that low-income groups did not benefit greatly from
Government support for rental housing. Most NHF financed rental units did not
fit the traditional pattern of rental tenancy but rather were what is locally
referred to as "long-term rental." Tenants of such units actually took on a
deferred purchase contract which allowed them to buy the unit in five years. To
participate in such a program, the tenant had to also participate in a
contractual savings program similar to that of traditional purchases. Almost
three quarters of the rental units financed by NHF were of this type.
39. The heavy emphasis on deferred purchase as opposed to traditional rental
limited the ability of the rental housing initiative to reach low-income
households. Another study by KRIHS found that the median income of occupants of
such units was approximately that of all households. KRIHS also found that the
major beneficiaries of the public rental programs were highly educated, middle
and lower-upper income households. Thus, the rental housing program did reach
a somewhat lower income group than the house purchase portfolio, but below-median
income households were served to only a limited extent.
40. In 1989, a program was launched by public institutions to build "permanent"
rental units, that is, those which would remain on the market as rental units and
not be available for purchase by the tenant. Approximately 100,000 such units
had been built as of the end of 1990. NHF financing for such units totaled
approximately W 343 billion.
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41. Expansion of availability of Housing Finance. The total volume of lending
for housing expanded greatly during the project period. At the end of 1985, the
total balance of credit for housing sold at W 5400 billion, approximately 16% of
deposit money banks' (commercial, local and specialized banks) portfolios; by the
end of 1990, the volume of outstanding housing had nearly tripled, accounting for
21% of total loan portfolios and 9.4% of GNP. The ratio of housing loans to
housing investment rose from 22.6% in 1985 to 41.7% in 1990.
42. However, the housing finance system retains many of the characteristics of
a Government program. The sought after increase in the supply of private sector
housing finance did not materialize and Government housing finance institutions
therefore continue to retain a dominant position in the market. KHB and NHF
still supply 86-87% of housing finance. Although deposit money banks were
allowed to lend for housing in 1988, they contributed only 4.8% of the total
balance of housing loans by the end of 1990.
43. Resource mobilization for both public and private housing finance programs
continues to rely on a number of compulsory savings sources. Contractual savings
schemes, which force households to supply low interest funds in return for the
right to a future loan, continue to be a major source of funds. Between 1986 and
1990, 25% of NHF funds were mobilized through the National Housing Subscription
Savings Deposit and over 30 percent through compulsory bond purchases. During the
same period, KHB raised 30% of its resources through the Savings Deposits for
Housing Purchase Program. Commercial banks also relied heavily on contractual
savings schemes.
44. The heavy reliance on contractual savings schemes and tax-like obligatory
bond sales is evidence of the slow pace of Korean financial sector liberalization
and the housing finance system's limited participation in it. The continued
control on short-term deposit rates limits the availability of funds and
introduces credit rationing. Moreover, the rates charged on housing loans also
continue to be controlled. While loan contracts are written so that rates could
be adjusted, the lending rate for KHB loans has been held nearly constant at
approximately 11.5% since 1984, although the inflation rate tripled from 2.5% to
8.6% from 1985 to 1990. Commercial bank rates are regulated and have been held
at the rate on 1 year corporate bonds, thereby prohibiting rates which would
reflect a reasonable term structure. Moreover, as long as lending rates remain
controlled, banks are prevented from accessing other market-priced resources.
As a consequence, restricting lending rates has effectively limited access to
funds and the volume of housing finance available.
45. Impact on the Housing Sector. The impact of the expansion of the housing
finance system on the sector is unclear. Increasing the provision of housing
finance exerts its effects on the housing market primarily by increasing demand.
However, severe restrictions on supply through restrictive housing sector
policies (designed to reduce speculation) have limited the ability of the private
sector to respond to the increased demand for urban housing. Development of new
land for housing is strictly controlled in Korea and requires a long and involved
approval process. Moreover, activities which might allow developers to use land
already designated for housing in a more efficient manner, such as building
higher density structures in the core of major cities, are subjected to a
similarly strict set of redevelopment controls. Controls on the price of new
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housing are applied only to multifamily structures and not to single family
homes, thereby discouraging high density development. Thus, strict control on
both the land used for housing and the ability of developers to substitute
capital for land have restricted the ability of developers to respond to
increases in the demand for housing. It will be of little use to expand the
supply of housing finance if the supply of housing is constrained and cannot
respond.
46. In such an environment, efforts such as those seen in Korea which attempt
to improve housing conditions through a greater supply of housing finance may not
be able to achieve their goals without other accompanying reforms. If housing
prices are rising rapidly in comparison to incomeW, increasing the loan to
value ratio or decreasing interest rates may have little impact: the total value
of the loan can increase to the point where the borrower still finds that he must
finance the same amount out of his/her own savings or pay the same monthly
payment. Moreover, under such severe supply constraints, increasing the supply
of housing finance may only exacerbate the problem. The rapid rate of
urbanization and large increase in the demand for housing in Korea at the time
of appraisal had already created a rapid rate of appreciation in land and housing
prices. If more finance were available, the probable still greater increase in
demand might have merely bid up the price of the existing housing stock to still
higher levels. Thus, a housing finance reform program such as that pursued in
this project must be accompanied or preceded by reforms of the housing supply
system.
47. Some of constraints in the supply of housing were met by the large
expansion of Government housing construction, which was supported by the Bank's
Urban Land Project. Government efforts to expand the supply of housing had begun
to show results by the end of the 1980s. Over the past five years, an average
of 334,000 units were constructed annually as compared to the previous average
annual production of 254,000 units. In 1990 alone, permits were issued for the
construction of 500,000 units. The Government's success in increasing the stock
of housing was reflected in a moderation of the inflation of housing prices,
which continued to increase in real terms, but at a lower rate than in the
previous 15 years. A high rate of wage growth has allowed the house price to
income ratio to decline slightly, although not sufficiently to return to its
level before the rapid appreciation of the 1970s. However, estimates show that
the housing sector still suffers from excess demand and annual production is
still far less than the 1 million units needed to meet existing and future
demand.7/ Apparently, neither the threefold increase in the supply of housing
finance nor the rapid expansion in Government land development activities-' were
sufficient solutions to the problems of the sector, although they did relieve
some of the pressure.
48. However, a long-term solution can only come through broadening housing
policy reform to those factors which restrict the supply of housing. While this
j/ The actual trend in the house price to income ratio or rent to income ratio
is still not available for the project years.
7/ See "Korea: Housing Project," Staff Appraisal Report, 1991.
D/ See Project Completion Report, Urban Land Development Project.
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project did not directly address these factors, it did contribute to the
subsequent development of a Housing Sector Project (Loan 3329-KO) with a broader
policy framework.
49. Economic Rate of Return. Estimates of the ex post rates of return on the
project are actually higher than the ex ante estimates. The estimated return on
the larger "Type A" units financed by the project increased from 17.5% to 20.0%
while that of the smaller "Type B" unit increased from 12.2% to 13.8%. However,
as noted in Annex I, returns have increased primarily due to increases in monthly
rents. Since an increase in rents is indicative of continued pressure in the
housing market, this result suggests real reform of the sector was not achieved
by the end of the project. Nonetheless, the subsequent moderation in house
price increases brought on by the Government's production program would be
considered at least a short-term success.
Proiect Sustainabilitv
50. Evaluating whether the benefits of the project are likely to continue must
again reflect its dual nature as both an investment and a policy program. In the
most narrow sense, the project's investment component is highly sustainable. The
institution in question, NHF, is very strong financially and likely to continue
to be a major source of housing finance. However, the sustainability of the
improvements seen in housing sector conditions by the end of the 1980s is less
clear. These improvements were achieved with a massive transfer of resources to
the housing sector and it is unlikely that the Government can maintain this level
of investment for a sufficient period to return conditions to their level at the
start of the decade. Thus, the general approach of Korean housing sector policy
may not be sustainable; a "sustainable" approach would rely on sectoral reforms
which would allow housing supply to adjust to demand. Nonetheless, the
willingness of local officials to meet the targets set forth in this loan
suggests a growing recognition of the need for housing and financial sector
reform. This result bodes well for the more ambitious program of housing reform
set forth in Loan 3329-KO and the financial sector reform program contemplated
under the proposed financial sector adjustment loan.
H. Borrower and Bank Performance
51. Relationships between Bank staff and Government officials was good
throughout the project and the continuing dialogue on policy issues led to the
next loan. All loan covenants for this project were complied with and timely
reports were submitted. By the end of the original period allocated to the
project, the policy objectives were met, and progress on these objectives
continued even after the loan was completely disbursed.
52. Twenty-one weeks of staff time were employed in supervising the project,
slightly less than the average for other projects in the sector in Korea.
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Lessons Learned
53. The following lessons were learned under the project:
(a) Design of sector proiect: Care should be taken not to define the
"sector" so narrowly that although all policy objectives are met, the
impact on the sector is minimal. In this case, the project's impact
was limited by the pace and coverage of financial sector
liberalization. While significant liberalization did occur in the
financial sector, it did not extend to the issues (interest rate, term
structure, etc.) most vital to the housing finance system. Thus,
housing finance operations should always, to the extent possible,
include representatives of the Ministry of Finance among the official
"clients" and coordinate activities with Bank financial sector
operations. In general, projects with a sectoral or policy focus
should monitor policies in other relevant sectors.
(b) Sequencing in Policy Reform Programs: Sectoral reform programs must
examine not only the types of reform necessary in the economy, but
also their order. In this case, attempting to expand the housing
finance system without complementary reform of the policies effecting
housing supply limited the success of the project. The importance of
sequencing was particularly evident in the efforts to promote private
commercial rental housing through expanded finance, which were almost
totally unsuccessful in the absence of regulatory reform. Thus, the
lack of accompanying reforms of regulations effecting the supply of
housing mitigated the impact of increasing the supply of finance.?'
(c) Evaluation of Policy Reform Projects: Extreme care should be applied
-o the interpretation of the rates of return achieved in policy reform
projects. For example, in this case, increases in housing prices
elevated the rate of return on units financed by the project. Thus,
a seemingly favorable result, a higher ex post rate of return,
actually signified continued distortions in the housing sector. For
this reason, project economic evaluations should include analysis of
the factors contributing to the change in rate of return estimates and
hiow these factors relate to the project's policy objectives.
9/ The subsequent Housing Sector Project, Loan 3329-KO, is addressing these
regulatory issues.
- 15 -
Sources:
World Bank, "Zorea: Hiousing Finance System," June 27, 1986
World Bank, "Korea: Housing Finance Sector Project," Staff Appraisal Report, May
26, 1987
Cho, Yoon-fe and Deena Khatkhate, "Lessons of Financial Liberalization in Asia:
A Comparative Study," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 50, 1989
World Bank, 'Korea: Country Economic Memorandum," October, 1989
Renaud, Bertrand, "Understanding the Collateral Qualities of Housing for
Financial Development: The Korean 'Chonse' as Effective Response to Financial
Sector Shortcomings," Infrastructure and Urban Development Department, INU
Discussion Paper 49, The World Bank, June 1989
Kim, Kyung-Hwan, "Housing Prices, Affordability, and Government Policy in Korea,"
Asia Region Series Internal Discussion Paper, Report No. IDP 99, The World Bank,
July 1991
Sekse, Rebecca, "Overview of the Financial Sector in Korea," The World Bank,
1992, processed.
World Bank, 'Xorea: Housing Sector Project," Staff Appraisal Report, May 3,
1991.
- 16 -
ANNEX I
ECONOMIC RATE OF RETURN CALCULATIONS
1. Calculation of economic rates of return are somewhat problematic in
sector lending programs. Even if funds are used to finance investments, as in
the present case, the real purpose of the loan is to promote policy reform.
Moreover, the importance of the rate of return is more difficult to interpret
than in traditional investment programs. If an ex post rate in an investment
project exceeds the ex ante rate, the program can unambiguously be judged a
success. However, in a sector loan, such a result may denote a lack of real
reform which allows price distortions and price increases to continue. These
considerations are particularly important in an environment such as the Korean
housing market, where supply restrictions have contributed to rapid inflation of
housing prices and rents.
2. Calculation of ex ante rates of return. The original rate of return
calculations used two stylized housing units which represented those financed in
the NHF portfolio. The market value of the housing services provided by such
units was compared with their initial construction costs. The market value of
the housing services was estimated using the chonsei system as the best
approximation of market price and calculated the interest income foregone by the
tenant over a month as the estimate of monthly rent. The informal market or
"curb" interest rate was used to represent "market" interest rates. The current
monthly rent derived from these figures was extrapolated over a twenty year
period, thereby implicitly assuming that the real value of rents would remain
constant.
3. Ex post rate of return. This same methodology was replicated in
calculating the ex post rate. Since the loan was largely disbursed in the first
year, the original costs estimates were used./ The market value of the benefit
provided by such units was calculated by inflating the original chonsei deposit
by the country-wide chonsei price index and computing the actual monthly rent as
the foregone interest at the current curb rate. Thus, estimates of monthly rent
were computed for 1987 to mid-1991. Monthly rents computed in this fashion were
deflated by tha CPI to estimate real rents. The 1991 real rent estimate was
again extrapolated so that the total rate of return would be calculated over
twenty years. The data and estimates for these calculations are included in the
attached table.
This methodology yielded the following results:
TvDe A Type B
Ex ante Rate 17.5 12.2
Ex Post Rate 20.0 13.8
1/ Since the loan financed NHF activities and not construction of designated
units, actual cost estimates would have been impossible to obtain.
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4. comparison of Ex ante and Ex post rates. Since costs were assumed
constant in the ex post calculations, only benefits contribute to the higher rate
of return. Thus, the higher rate of return was due to the increase in the
estimate of monthly rent throughout the project. Curb market interest rates were
actually declining during this period, so the rate at which interest was foregone
declined as well. Thus, the increase in the rate of return of the project is
solely due to the appreciation in the level of chonsei deposits demanded of
tenants.
5. Traditionally, such an increase in the rate of return would imply a
successful project. However, the purpose of this project was to relieve the
excess demand in the housing market through increased provision of housing
finance. If housing prices, as estimated by chonsei, continue to increase and
exceeded the original estimates, such a result was not achieved. Moreover, the
fact that the rate of return rose despite a decline in interest rates implies
that whatever benefits were achieved by financial sector reform, were overcome
by the continuing problems of the housing sector.
6. Finally, it should be noted that calculating rates of return on a unit
built in 1990 would yield somewhat different results. Building material and
construction costs have increased rapidly in the last five years, and a rate of
return calculated on such a unit would undoubtedly be lower. However, the units
financed under this project would not have been directly effected by the increase
in construction costs.
DATA FOR RATE OF RETURN CALCULATIONS
ESTIMATE ACTUAL CURB INTEREST ESTIMATED MONTHLY CPI
CHONSEI | RATE RATE
YEAR INDEX
TYPE A TYPE B ANNUAL MONTHLY TYPE A TYPE B 1985=100
1986 100.0 |10,864000 6,419,000 23.1 1.75 217,280 128.380 102.8
1987 119.0 12,982,480 7,638,610 23.0 1.74 225.895 132.912 105.9
1988 135.3 14,698,992 8,684,907 22.7 1.72 252,822 149,380 113.5
1989 159.1 17,284,624 10,212,629 19.1 1.47 2 150,126 119.9
1990 135.6 20, 411,913,664 18.7 1.44 290,355 171,557 133.3
mid-1991 193.6 21,030,618 12,427,184 18.6* 1.43 302,840 177,709 n.a.
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Annex II
KOREA
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL LENDING BY THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM, 1986-90
Table 1: KOREA HOUSING BANK LOAN PORTFOLIO
End of Year Balance (billion Won)
Year Proiect* Actual**
1986 - 2,251 *
1987 2,311.9 2,862
1988 2,727.8 3,290
1989 3,208.2 4,670
1990 3,762.5 6,169
* From Balance sheet, term portion of housing loans only
A** Source: Korea Housing Bank, "Monthly Economic Review
*** 1986 total at appraisal was preliminary, hence slight
discrepancy
Table 2: NATIONAL HOUSING FUND PORTFOLIO
End of year Balance (billion Won)
Year Proiected* Actual**
1986 2,650 2,830***
1987 3,231 3,284
1938 3,803 3,806
1989 4,425 4,878
1990 6,170 7,075
* From appraisal balance sheet; operating assets plus
current portion loans receivable; excludes rural and "other
** Source: Korea Housing Bank, "Monthly Economic Review"
excludes rural, dormitory and "other"
1986 balance at appraisal was preliminary, hence slight
discrepancy with actual figure
- 19 -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
HOUSING FINANCE SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 2853-KO)
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
The Borrower did not submit Part II of the report.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
HOUSING FINANCE SECTOR PROJECT (LOAN 2853-KO)
PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1. Related Bank Loans
Loan/Credit Purpose Year of Status Comments
Approval
LN 1980-KO To provide housing for low-income families and to 04/30/81 Completed. PCR No.
National Urban further develop the capabilities of the major 8689 of
Land Development public institutions serving the housing sector, 05/23/90
and Housing I namely Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) and PPAR
and Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC). No. 9723
The objectives to be pursued in the context of an of o
ongoing dialogue on housing policy issues between 06/23/91
the Bank and the Korean Govenment was through the have been
technical assistance and housing sector study. issued.
LN 2216-KO To advance the Bank/Government dialogue on sector 12/14/82 Completed. PCR No.
National Urban policy and programs and thus (a) assist in 8689 of
Land Development rationalizing and strengthening the housing and 05/23/90
& Housing II land development institutions in the public and PPAR
sector; (b) support the development of the No. 9723
National Housing Fund (NHF) as a viable financial of
intermediary with capacity for project appraisal 06/23/91
and supervision; and (c) support investments in have been
the policies and programs for delivering housing issued.
to lower income families by financing the
development of land and housing by KLDC and KNHC.
LN 3329-KO To support the government's housing sector 05/23/91 Project Project
Housing Sector strategy by providing resources through the being became
National Housing Fund for lower-income housing and executed. effective
by assisting the government in formulating a 10/16/91.
framework for housing policy development and an
agenda for policy reform in the sector. The
government's housing policy objectives are to
target public housing assistance in terms of the
needs of the recipients and to minimize the cost
of providing the assistance, while improving
regulation of the sector in order to increase the
efficiency of housing services.
, .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
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2. Proiect Timetable
ACTIVITY/EVENT DATE PLANNED DATE REVISED DATE ACTUAL
Project Identification May 1986
Preappraisal Mission November 1986
Appraisal Mission February 1987 March 1987 Feb. 16-28, 1987
Negotiations April 27, 1987 Apr.30-May 5, 1987
Board Approval June 1987 June 16, 1987 June 23, 1987
Loan Signing June 1987 Aug. 6, 1987
Loan Effectiveness Oct. 22, 1987
Completion Date June 30, 1990 Nov. 22, 1989
Closing Date June 30, 1991 Nov. 22, 1989
Final Disbursement Nov. 22, 1989
Final Loan Account Dec. 4, 1989
Closing
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3. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(USS Million)
Appraisal Actual Actual as % Actual as
FY Semester Estimate Amount of Appraisal % of Loan
1988 12/31/87 20.0 60.26 301.30 40.2
06/30/88 25.0 120.16 480.64 80.1
1989 12/31/88 39.0 135.16 346.56 90.1
06/30/89 69.0 140.99 204.33 94.0
1990 12/31/89 100.5 150.00 149.25 100.0
06/30/90 124.5
1991 12/31/90 141.0
06/30/91 150.0
Note: With the final disbursement on November 22, 1989, the loan account was
closed, eighteen months prior to the original loan closing date of June 30, 1991.
US$ 149,986.50 were disbursed against sub-loans for civil work, i.e. 40% of the
National Housing Fund's expenditures and USS 13,139.50 against Special account
to reflect the currency exchange rate fluctuations.
4. Proiect Costs and Financing
a) Project Costs - Appraisal
Project Components Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
------------ (Won Million)------------ -------------- (US$ Million)--------------
NHF Housing Program:
Rental Unite 381,011 133,869 514,880 443.0 155.7 5987
Sale Units 536,732 188,512 725,244 624.1 219.2 8433
Training & Studies 258 172 430 0.3 0.2 05
TOTAL 918.001 322.553 1.240.554* 1.067.4 ,375 1 14425
b) Project Costs - Actual
Project Components Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
------------ (Won Million)------------ -------------- (USS Million)--------------
NHF Housing Program:
Rental Units 396,639 139,360 535,999** 536.0 188.3 7243 >
Sale Units 305,936 107,499 413,435** 413.4 145.3 5587
Training & Studies 264 175 439 0.4 0.2 06
TOTAL 702 839 247.034 949,873 949.8 333.8 1.2836
c) Project Financing - Appraisal vs. Actual
------------ Appraisal ------------ -------------- Actual--------------
Local Foreign Total Share Local Foreign Total Share
(US$ Million) (USS Million)
Government 1,067.4 225.1 1,292.5 90% 949.8 183.8 1,133.6 88%
Bank Loan 0.0 150.0 150.0 10% 0.0 150.0 150.0 12%
TOTAL 1.067.4 375.1 1.442.5 100% 949.8 333.8 1.283.6 100t
Plan 1987 and 1988
** Allocations during 1987 and 1988
Note; By end of 1989, allocations were 243,058 million won instead of original estimates for the 87-89 period.
- 25 -
8. Project Results
a) National Housing Fund - Balance Sheet as of December 31
(Won MilLion)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
CURRENT ASSETS 307,427 221,468 444,848 1,399,613 1,293,016 1,350,174
..- - -- - - -- -- -- -- -- -- .. ...------ . ......... ......... . ... --------- .............. ............ ...... ..
Time Deposits 26,000 30,000 201,000 796,983 250,000 120,000
Special Account 0 7 1 0 0 0
Current Loan 245,642 136,327 172,216 479,362 949,862 1,286,871
Accounts in KHS 150 7,981 20,873 45,362 (99,503) (272,526)
Accrued Income 35,581 47,034 50,684 77,867 104,608 117,780
Unsettled Payment 54 119 74 39 88,049 98,049
Long-Term Loans 2,830,620 3,508,783 4,014,862 4,818,916 6,787,916 8,280,260
Investments 1,415 129 63 25 0 0
Other Receivables 31 1,590 244 118 0 0
Deferred Assets 5,109 3,406 1,703 0 0 0
ASSETS TOTAL 3,144,602 3,735,376 4,461,720 6,218,672 8,080,932 9,630,434
......... s .... a.... ..... s.... ......... ....=.s.s. .. =..==ss =.=...=s.
CURRENT LIABILITY 947,257 843,559 849,747 1,354,714 1,858,546 1,741,613
............--- -- - - - -- - - -.--- - - - - - --.-- - - ...... .
Accounts Payabte 10,401 12,236 14,407 13,762 13,762 13,762
Unsettled Receipts 63 121 476 530 530 530
Subscription Deposit 137,162 114,069 164,866 118,714 287,786 501,836
Public Org. Deposits 101,900 39,000 34,757 37,435 7,462 28,674
Accrued Expenses 52,597 43,966 51,172 96,034 96,034 96,034
Revenue Received Advance 4,454 7,858 5,168 6,052 6,052 6,052
Income Taxes Payable 167 163 244 201 201 201
Credit ControL Fund 248,960 270,518 254,130 330,192 712,192 666,991
Type-1 Bond 233,660 299,519 285,736 299,021 283,922 334,128
Fund Bond 167 0 0 300,000 0 0
Construction Loan 0 156 8 0 0 0
IBRO Loans 6,614 7,384 5,929 5,695 15,000 15,000
MOF Loans 0 0 0 20,994 357,200 0
LiabiLity Allow.-Type 1 Bond 151,112 48,390 32,838 27,408 78,400 78,400
Liability Allow.-Fund Bond 0 0 0 98,671 0 0
Income Received 0 179 16 5 5 5
FIXED LIABILITIES 1,919,569 2,337,995 2,907,970 3,973,887 5,234,166 6,743,480
Subscription Deposit 232,351 130,282 242,796 982,575 1,659,403 2,170,412
Type-1 Bond 1,114,882 1,193,899 1,422,103 1,768,122 2,333,812 2,925,276
Type-2 Bond 317,636 332,999 370,414 459,706 770,706 1,097,256
Fund Bond 0 300,000 300,000 0 0 0
Construction Loan 163 8 0 0 0 0
IBRD Loans 58,363 121,227 141,034 140,157 124,852 135,398
MOF Loans 0 0 130,000 339,006 0 0
Public Org. Deposits 63,757 72,192 44,897 36,136 61,627 32,953
Liability ALlow.-Type 1 Bond 113,305 138,T77 159,115 194,386 209,517 279,917
Liability Allow.-Type 2 Bond 19,112 29,371 40,878 53,799 74,249 102,268
Liability ALLow.-Fund Bond 0 19,240 56,733 0 0 0
DEFERRED LIABILITIES 0 0 24,682 18,511 12,341 6,170
LIABILITY TOTAL 2,866,826 3,181,554 3,782,399 5,347,112 7,105,053 8,491,263
==.==z= ... ===5 3 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
EQUITY TOTAL 277,773 430,823 556,321 748,559 975,878 1,139,171
========5555 ~~~--------- --------- --------- ......... --------- ---------
Govt. Contributions 183,000 283,000 313,000 343,000 343,000 343,000
Nat'L Housing Lottery Fund 81,542 92,844 104,052 134,710 169,710 204,710
Retained Earning - Beginning (18,168) 13,232 54,977 139,269 270,845 463,168
Adjusted Balance (83) (159) (21) (83) 0 0
Net Income 31,484 41,906 84,313 131,663 192,323 128,293
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 3,144,601 3,612,377 4,338,720 6,095,671 8,080,931 9,630,434
Current Ratio 32.5% 26.3% 52.4% 103.3% 69.6% 77.5%
Equity Ratio 8.8% 11.5% 12.5% 12.0% 12.1% 11.8%
Debt Ratio 91.2% 85.2% 84.8% 86.0% 87.9% 88.2%
Debt Equity Ratio 1032.1% 738.5% 679.9% 714.3% 728.1% 745.4%
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5. Project Results
b) National Housing Fund - Income Statement
For the 12 Months Ended December 31
(Won Million)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
TOTAL OPERATING INCOME 247,140 276,632 318,962 423,641 583,198 575,752
(Interest Income)
Time Deposits 5,910 1,295 7,764 67,309 104,698 37,000
Special Account 127 37 64 3 0 0
Other Deposits 0 1 1 1 0 0
Loans 241,018 274,995 310,977 356,182 478,500 538,752
KHB Account 81 298 142 141 0 0
Miscellaneous 4 6 14 5 0 0
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSE 161,620 173,240 184,231 246,041 328,218 372,145
,- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .....................
(Interest Expense)
Subscription Deposits 33,177 25,091 24,446 56,380 113,674 162,328
Type-1 Bond 108,012 96,729 87,559 100,628 126,491 146,928
Type-2 Bond 8,192 10,273 11,539 13,021 20,301 28,019
Fund Bond 0 19,241 37,493 41,937 20,100 0
National Fund Borrowing 28 17 7 0 0 0
IBRD Loans 5,085 6,416 10,527 10,170 9,999 10,158
MOF Loans 0 0 2,568 16,239 30,688 18,176
Public Org. Deposits 6,998 13,630 9,915 7,615 6,965 6,536
Commitment Charges 128 1,843 177 51 0 0
GROSS PROFIT 85,520 103,392 134,731 177,600 254,980 203,607
ADMINISTRATION FEE EXPENSE 43,903 45,537 52,567 51,942 56,114 66,372
OPERATING PROFIT 41,617 57,855 82,164 125,658 198,866 137,235
NON-OPERATING INCOME 455 514 703 619 0 0
Miscellaneous 455 514 703 619 0 0
TOTAL NON-OPERATING EXPENSE 10,588 16,507 (1,258) (5,369) 6,543 8,942
Housing Gurantee Fund 0 0 3,739 4,404 6,247 8,542
Consultant Fee 30 113 258 125 100 200
Overseas Training 75 8 61 93 196 200
Foreign Exchange Loss 8,781 14,684 61 0 0 0
Foreign Exchange Adjustment 1,702 1,702 (5,377) (9,991) 0 0
REAL ESTATE DISPOSAL 0 44 188 17 0 0
NET INCOME 31,484 41,906 84,313 131,663 192,323 128,293
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5. Prolect Results
c) Studies
1. Optimum Allocation of Housing Finance: The study explored measures to
improve fund mobilization and development of new lending programs. The study
originally planned to be completed in December 1988 was completed in February
1989. The results of the study have proceeded more slowly than anticipated, in
part due to the economic slowdown of 1989/90. Thus some types of direct controls
have not been relaxed. However, the rules for lending to housing constructors
were liberalized in terms of the maximum loan amounts, the share of costs which
could be financed and timing of loan withdrawals. The requirements regarding
participation in savings schemes were also relaxed allowing more borrowers to be
eligible for larger loans. A graduated payment system was also offered at KHB
and lending procedures in general were eimplified. KHB further expanded its home
financing services by establishing a Credit Guarantee Fund at the beginning of
1988. The objective of this Fund was to provide insurance to lenders for certain
types of clients without conventional or sufficient collateral. This program is
targeted to lower income households and employers providing housing to their
workers. The limits of the guarantee are quite modest (W 30 million for house
purchase), but the broader impact on lender's willingness to service these types
of clients may be important in expanding mortgage services. KHB also increased
the age of houses it was willing to finance from 5 to 10 years, considerably
enlarging the stock of reasonably priced housing for which KHB mortgages were
available.
2. Evaluation of Public Sector Housing Program: The study evaluated public
housing programs with special emphasis on housing finance aspects. The results
of the study turned out to be more preliminary and more narrowly focused than
envisaged at the time of appraisal. The analysis and recommendations contained
in the study did not complete the analysis as originally envisaged. The
methodology of describing the outputs of public programs and regulations as
comparable monetarized factors turned out to require several preparatory or
development steps in advance of the detailed analysis. The study laid some of
the groundwork for subsequent analysis by carefully describing each of the public
sector programs and by measuring the main characteristics of each. The result
is a detailed description of public housing programs but not the type of
quantitative analysis which could be directly used to adjust policies and
programs.
6. Status of Maior Covenants
Section Subject Status
2.02 (b) Borrower to open and maintain in dollars a special Complied with.
account in the Korea Exchange Bank on terms and
conditions satisfactory to the Bank
3.03 Borrower to approve the Sub-projects, and make sub- Complied with.
loans through NHF, in accordance with criteria agreed
with the Bank.
3.04 Borrower to review annually with the Bank the progress Complied with.
achieved in the implementation of the Policy
Statement. The first such review to take place not
later than 06/30/88.
3.05 Borrower to furnish to the Bank, for the Bank's review No changes to date.
and comments, any proposed changes to the Policy m
Statement.
3.06 The Borrower to furnish to the Bank, not later than Complied with. Two studies: (a)
12/31/88, the results of each of the studies under Optimum Allocation of Housing
Part B.1. of the Project, for the Bank's review and Finance; and (b) Evaluation of
comments. Public Sector Housing Program
were completed February 1989.
4.01 The Borrower to have the records and accounts, Complied with. Ministry of
including those for the Special Account and Statements Construction (MOC) maintained
of Expenditures to be maintained and audited and records and Audited accounts were
furnish to the Bank audit report, nine months after submitted on time.
the end of each fiscal year.
Schedule 1, 1. Loan amount to meet 40% of NHF expenditures for civil Complied with. A total of
works contracts of each sub-loan. US$ 149,986,860.50 was disbursed
against civil works.
Schedule 1, 2. No withdrawals to be made for expenditures for civil No such case found.
works contracts costing less than US$500,000.
7. Use of Bank Resources
a) Bank Staff/Consultant Inputs
(Staff weeks)
PROJECT CYCLE 
- BANK FISCAL YEAR
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 TOTAL
Preparation .1 1.8 40.3 42.2
Appraisal 5.8 5.8
Negotiations 11.9 11.9
Loan Processing .4 .1 20.0 
_ 20.5
Supervision 5.5 8.3 7.1 .1 21.0
Project Completion I _ 4.7 10.4 15.1
TOTALS .5 2.0 78.0 5.5 8.3 7.1 4.8 10.4 116.5
7. Use of Bank Resources
b) Bank Missions
TYPE OF MISSION TERMS OF DATES STAFF PERFORMANCE MISSION
REFERENCE RATINGS REPORTS
Identification 04/28/86 05/86 Sr. Economist -___ ___l
Preparation 1 06/13/86 06/20-24/86 Loan Officer --- 08/07/86
Housing Advisor
Preparation 2 --- 09/86 Sr. Economist --___ ___
Preappraisal 11/20/86 11/24-12/10/86 Sr. Economist --- 12/29/86
Financial Analyst
Housing Advisor
Economist
Economist
Economist (c)
Appraisal 02/12/87 02/16-28/87 Sr. Economist --- Yellow cover
Financial Analyst 03/20/87
Post Appraisal 06/11/87 06/15-21/87 Sr. Economist --- ---
Economist
Supervision 1 01/25/88 02/88 Sr. Economist 1 04/25/88
Economist
Supervision 2 04/25/88 05/07-19/88 Sr. Economist 1 07/07/88
Economist
Supervision 3 --- 05/25-27/88 Housing Advisor --- 05/27/88
Supervision 4 08/03/88 08/07-14/88 Sr. Economist --- ---
Economist
Economist (C)
Supervision 5 01/10/89 01/29-02/02/89 Sr. Economist --- 03/07/89
Supervision 6 07/07/89 07/16-26/89 Sr. Economist 1 08/25/89
Supervision 7 02/19/90 02/19-03/01/90 Sr. Economist 1 04/27/90
Supervision 8 05/02/90 05/90 Sr. Economist --- 06/18/90
Supervision 9 09/07/90 09/90 Sr. Economist --- 11/05/90
